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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 Lawyers and accountants are different professionals in many ways.  For 
accountants, most of their work is black or white.  In providing services to a client, 
an accountant must comply with a wide array of rules concerning a client’s financial 
accounting and tax reporting.  Compliance with accounting principles and auditing 
standards is just one of the items an accountant must evaluate in reviewing a 
company’s financial statements.  In addition, an accountant’s client must comply 
with voluminous and highly complex tax laws.  Most of these standards set forth the 
“right” way to account for any given financial statement item.  While an accountant 
must still use professional judgment in estimating such items as bad debt reserves or 
depreciation allowances, the rules are fairly black and white for a majority of financial 
accounting decisions.  For example, balance sheets must balance at the end of the 
day.  The accountant must perform a search for unrecorded liabilities and make an 
accrual for any unrecorded amounts discovered.  An accountant works hand in hand 
with the client to produce accurate financial statements. 
 For lawyers, however, things have always been greyer.  For every cause of 
action, there are two sides to the story.  Two lawyers, looking at the same set of 
facts, will make a different argument concerning liability depending on whether they 
sit on the plaintiff’s or defendant’s side of the courtroom.  In addition, lawyers exist 
in an inherently adversarial environment.  While a trial might clearly evidence this 
two-party conflict, business transactions also require an attorney to pursue his 
client’s needs at the expense of the other side.  Whether in a trial or transactional 
setting, lawyers guard their clients’ confidences vigorously and avoid disclosure of 
key information to any other party.  Therefore, an attorney’s reluctance to disclose 
any meaningful information in his or her response to an audit inquiry letter is 
understandable.  In the context of responding to an audit inquiry letter, an attorney’s 
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most basic fear is that any evaluation or assessment of a client’s liability, or any 
estimate that the attorney might make, concerning a specific claim will be disclosed 
to an adversarial party and used against the client in a subsequent court proceeding.  
Over the past twenty years, court cases have validated this fear. 
 For lawyers, the audit inquiry letter has become a necessary evil.  Inevitably, 
the attorney’s response to the audit inquiry letter is one of the last open items that an 
accountant attempts to wrap up at the end of audit field work.  The response that is 
eventually received, however, may not actually be that useful to the accountant in 
evaluating loss contingencies.  Most responses only result in verifying claims that the 
client has already disclosed to the auditor.  In most instances, the auditor could 
actually obtain more information just by reviewing the pleadings filed at the local 
courthouse.  One might say the attorney’s response says a lot while at the same time 
saying nothing at all. 
 Perhaps acknowledging some flaws in the current methods, the Auditing 
Standards Board formed a “Legal Inquiry Letters Reeducation Task Force.”1  Jointly 
comprised of members from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(“AICPA”) and members of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), the task force 
was “established to address concerns regarding language used by auditors in audit 
inquiry letters . . . and responses by attorneys to those letters.”2  Unfortunately, this 
task force was disbanded before taking any action.   
This article will examine whether the attorney’s response to the audit inquiry 
letter serves any meaningful purpose.  In addition, this article considers attorneys’ 
concerns when responding to audit inquiry letters and evaluates the validity of these 
concerns.  Part I of this article reviews the current financial accounting and auditing 
standards that relate to audit inquiry letters and reviews the underlying purpose of 
the audit inquiry letter.  In addition, Part I summarizes the ABA Statement of Policy 
that relates to attorneys’ responses to audit inquiry letters.  Part II summarizes the 
major elements of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine – two 
legal principles that underlie a majority of cases involving audit-inquiry letters.  Part 
II also looks at the significant court cases involving the issue of audit inquiry letters 
over the years.  Part III analyzes whether the fundamental purpose of the audit 
inquiry letter is being served.  In addition, Part III looks at the validity of attorneys’ 
fears of audit inquiry letters and how their responses to these letters could be 
                                                 
1 Highlights of Technical Activities, 20 IN OUR OPINION……..,:  THE NEWSLETTER OF THE AICPA 
AUDIT AND ATTEST STANDARDS GROUP 12 (2004). 
2 Id. 
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changed in the future.  Finally, Part IV concludes that serving the purposes of the 
audit inquiry letter requires more forthcoming responses from attorneys.         
II.  REVIEWING THE GROUND RULES 
A. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5:   
Accounting for Contingencies 
 
 Established in 1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) 
promulgates generally accepted accounting principles in the United States.  Generally 
accepted accounting principles are financial accounting rules that have received 
substantial authoritative support.3  Preparation of a company’s financial statements 
must conform to generally accepted accounting principles, which reflect 
 the consensus at a particular time as to which economic resources 
and obligations should be recorded as assets and liabilities…, which 
changes in assets and liabilities should be recorded, when these 
changes should be recorded, how the assets and liabilities and 
changes in them should be measured, what information should be 
disclosed and how it should be disclosed, and which financial 
statements should be prepared.4 
In March 1975, the FASB issued Statement No. 5, which governs accounting 
for contingencies.5  A loss contingency6 is defined as “an existing condition, 
situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible . . . loss . . . to 
an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur 
or fail to occur.”7  In assessing whether a loss contingency involving litigation, 
                                                 
3 Statement No. 4, § 1026.01 n.1 (AICPA Accounting Principles Bd. 1970). 
4  Id. at § 1026.01. 
5 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) (hereinafter “SFAS No. 5”). 
6 The loss contingency that an auditor attempts to address in sending the audit inquiry letter is 
pending or threatened litigation.  Other examples of loss contingencies include collectibility of 
receivables, obligations related to product warranties and product defects, and guarantees of 
indebtedness of others.  However, these other types of loss contingencies are not considered within 
the scope of this article.  
7 SFAS No. 5, ¶1. 
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claims, or assessments (whether asserted or unasserted) requires accrual and/or 
disclosure in the financial statements, the auditor must evaluate the following factors:  
“(a) The period in which the underlying cause . . . of the pending or threatened 
litigation or of the actual or possible claim or assessment occurred[;] (b) The degree 
of probability of an unfavorable outcome[;] (c) The ability to make a reasonable 
estimate of the amount of loss.”8 
 A loss contingency is classified as being probable, reasonably possible, or 
remote, based upon the likelihood that the future event confirming the existence of a 
loss will occur.9  A loss contingency is considered probable if “[t]he future event or 
events are likely to occur.”10  A loss contingency is classified as reasonably possible if 
“[t]he chance of the future event or events occurring is more than remote but less 
than likely.”11   A loss contingency is deemed remote if “[t]he chance of the future 
event or events occurring is slight.”12  Instead of specifying percentage guidelines to 
help classify a loss contingency, the FASB requires the auditor to exercise 
professional judgment.  
The auditor’s classification of a loss contingency as either probable, 
reasonably possible, or remote determines how the loss contingency will be handled 
in the financial statements.  A loss contingency is accrued, meaning charged against 
income, if (1) “[i]nformation available prior to issuance of the financial statements 
indicates that [the loss contingency] is probable” and (2) “[t]he amount of loss can be 
reasonably estimated.”13  Absolute certainty of a loss is not required; the likelihood 
need only be classified as probable.14  In addition to accruing the loss, the auditor 
may need to make a disclosure explaining the nature of the accrual.15 
                                                 
8 Id. ¶33. 
9 Id. ¶3. 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. ¶8. 
14 Id. ¶84. 
15 Id. ¶9. 
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The auditor should disclose a loss contingency in the footnotes of the 
financial statements if the likelihood of occurrence is classified as reasonably 
possible.16  The disclosure should identify the “nature of the contingency” and “give 
an estimate of the possible loss.”17  In the event the exact amount of the loss is not 
known, the disclosure should indicate the possible range of loss or state that no 
estimate of the loss is possible.18 Disclosure is required for unasserted claims or 
assessments if the assertion of a claim is probable and the likelihood that the 
outcome will be unfavorable is reasonably possible.19  In some instances, a loss 
arising after the date of the financial statements might require disclosure to prevent 
the financial statements of the company from being misleading.20  A loss contingency 
categorized as remote does not generally require disclosure in the financial 
statements.21 
B.  Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12 
 Subsequent to the promulgation of SFAS No. 5, both the accounting and 
legal professions issued guidance that addressed audit inquiry letters.  The Auditing 
Standards Board, a technical committee of the AICPA, develops Statements of 
Auditing Standards.22  Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, Inquiry of a Client’s 
Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, was approved on January 7, 
1976, and “provides guidance on the procedures an independent auditor should 
consider for identifying litigation.”23  When assessing litigation, the auditor should 
obtain information concerning the following factors: 
                                                 
16 Id. ¶10. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. ¶11. 
21 See generally, SFAS No. 5. 
22 JACK E. KIGER & JAMES H. SCHEINER, AUDITING 41 (1994).  
23 INQUIRY OF A CLIENT’S LAWYER CONCERNING LITIGATION, CLAIMS, AND ASSESSMENTS, 
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 12, ¶1 (Auditing Standards Bd. 1976) (hereinafter “SAS No. 
12”). 
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 a. The existence of a condition, situation, or set of circumstances 
indicating an uncertainty as to the possible loss to an entity arising 
from litigation, claims, and assessments. 
b. The period in which the underlying cause for legal action occurred. 
c. The degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome. 
d. The amount or range of potential loss.24 
As part of the audit procedures, the auditor discusses litigation with company 
management to ensure that litigation existing as of the balance sheet date is identified 
and disclosed in the financial statements in accordance with SFAS No. 5.25  The 
auditor sends an audit inquiry letter to the lawyer as a means of confirming litigation, 
claims, and assessments identified by management.26 
C.  The Audit Inquiry Letter 
 In many ways, the audit inquiry letter is similar to other confirmation letters 
sent to third parties during the course of a financial audit.  Just as a cash 
confirmation confirms the bank balance of company cash accounts at the end of the 
year, the audit inquiry letter serves as corroboration of management’s representations 
concerning litigation.27  The audit inquiry letter is written on management’s 
letterhead and mailed to the attorney by the accountant.  The lawyer returns the 
response directly to the accountant. 
 The audit inquiry letter should identify the company and any subsidiaries 
being audited and the corresponding audit period.28  The letter will request the 
attorney to confirm information that the client has provided to the auditors 
                                                 
24 SAS No. 12, ¶4. 
25 Id. ¶5(d). 
26 Id.  The audit inquiry letter is only one of many auditing procedures performed to identify and 
evaluate litigation.  Other audit procedures include  reviewing minutes of stockholder meetings and 
board of directors; reading important documents, such as contracts, loan agreements, and leases; and 
identifying possible guarantees.  SAS No. 12, ¶7. 
27 SAS No. 12, ¶8. 
28 Id. at  ¶9(a). 
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concerning pending or threatened litigation, claims, and assessments.29  Alternatively, 
in the event management does not prepare a list of pending litigation, the letter will 
request that the lawyer prepare the list.30 
Pending litigation is restricted to actions “with respect to which the lawyer 
has been engaged and to which he has devoted substantive attention on behalf of the 
company in the form of legal consultation or representation.”31  The list of pending 
litigation should describe the nature of the litigation, including the proceeding, claim, 
or claims asserted, amount of damages sought, and whether the damages are covered 
by insurance.32  In addition, the list should identify the progress of the case (such as 
whether the case is during the discovery, trial, or appeal phase) as well as the action 
the company plans to take regarding the litigation (such as “to contest the matter 
vigorously or to seek an out-of-court settlement”).33  The list should also specify the 
likelihood of an “unfavorable outcome” for each pending claim and make an 
estimate concerning “the amount or range of [any] potential loss.”34 
Management should prepare a list of unasserted claims and assessments that 
it “considers to be probable of assertion, and that, if asserted, would have at least a 
reasonable possibility of an unfavorable outcome.”35  Like pending litigation, 
unasserted litigation is similarly restricted to matters for which the attorney has been 
engaged36 and to which he has devoted substantive attention in conjunction with 
representing the company.  The lawyer is asked to comment on the list of unasserted 
claims only if his description or evaluation of the matter differs from the client’s.37 
                                                 
29 Id. at ¶9(b). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at ¶9(d)(1). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at ¶9(d)(2). 
35 Id. at ¶9(c). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at ¶9(e). 
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The audit inquiry letter also requests the attorney to confirm that, in the 
event an unasserted possible claim comes to his attention during the course of 
providing legal services to the client, the attorney will consult with the client 
regarding disclosure and compliance with the requirements of SFAS No. 5.38  While 
the audit inquiry letter can be restricted to material litigation, the client, auditor, and 
lawyer must each understand any materiality limitations.39  Finally, the audit inquiry 
letter should “request that the lawyer specifically identify the nature of and reasons 
for any limitation on his response.”40 
D.  ABA Statement of Policy 
 Around the same time the Auditing Standards Board was developing SAS 
No. 12, the ABA was writing similar guidelines for lawyers concerning the 
recommended approach for responding to an audit inquiry letter.  On December 8, 
1975, the ABA’s Board of Governors approved the ABA Statement of Policy 
Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information (the “ABA 
Statement”).41  While auditors must comply with the requirements of both SFAS No. 
5 and SAS No. 12, attorneys are not required to follow the ABA Statement when 
responding to audit inquiry letters.  The ABA Statement is merely a guide.42 
 The ABA Statement opens with a Preamble that comes across as both 
cautionary and defensive.  The opening line of the ABA Statement proclaims, “The 
public interest in protecting the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications is 
fundamental.”43  The ABA Statement warns that the attorney’s disclosure of lawyer-
                                                 
38 Id.  at ¶9(f).  “In some circumstances, a lawyer may be required . . . to resign his engagement if his 
advice concerning financial accounting and reporting for litigation, claims, and assessments is 
disregarded by the client.”  Id. at ¶11. 
39 SFAS No. 12, ¶9. 
40 Id. at ¶9(h).  A lawyer’s refusal to comply with the requests made in the audit inquiry letter would be 
considered a scope limitation that prevents issuance of an unqualified audit opinion.  Id. at ¶13. 
41 American Bar Association, Statement of Policy Regarding Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information 
(1975), in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK 4 (2003) (hereinafter 
“AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK” “Statement of Policy”).  The Statement of Policy can also be found at 31 
BUS. LAWYER 1709 (1976). 
42 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶8, at 9.  
43 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Preamble, at 4. 
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client information to the auditor “may significantly impair the client’s ability in other 
contexts to maintain the confidentiality of such communications.”44      
While recognizing the importance of investors’ ability to rely on accurate and 
complete financial statements, the Preamble asserts that this public policy goal 
should not undermine the attorney-client relationship.45  The ABA Statement 
acknowledges that attorneys are most likely the best resource for obtaining 
information about claims that have been asserted, but strongly admonishes that “it is 
not in the public interest for the lawyer to be required to respond to general inquiries 
from auditors concerning possible claims.”46 
 Before replying to the auditor’s request for information, the lawyer should 
verify that the client representative who signed the audit inquiry letter is authorized 
to consent to the lawyer’s disclosure of information to the auditor.47  The lawyer may 
limit his or her response to the auditor in several ways.  For example, the response 
need cover only matters that are “individually or collectively material” to the financial 
statements and to which the lawyer has given “substantive attention” via legal 
representation or consultation for the period covered by the audit.48  The lawyer may 
also limit the response by stating that the reply is intended only for the auditor’s 
information, thus preventing dissemination of the lawyer’s response to other 
individuals.49  Because these limitations are referenced specifically in the ABA 
Statement, they do not have to be explicitly stated in the attorney’s reply.  If the 
attorney’s response is limited by information contained in the ABA Statement, 
however, the response should contain appropriate language indicating this limitation 
and should reference the full title of the ABA Statement.50  
 Upon receipt of a proper client request, the lawyer may report the following 
matters to the auditor: 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 4-5. 
46 Id. at 5. 
47 See AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶1, at 5. 
48 Id. ¶¶2,3, at 6. 
49 See id. ¶7, at 9. 
50 See id. ¶8, at 9. 
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(a) overtly threatened or pending litigation, whether or not specified by the 
client;   
(b) a contractually assumed obligation which the client has specifically 
identified and upon which the client has specifically requested, in 
the inquiry letter or a supplement thereto, comment to the 
auditor; 
(c) an unasserted possible claim or assessment which the client has 
specifically identified and upon which the client has specifically 
requested, in the inquiry letter or a supplement thereto, comment 
to the auditor.51 
As the above language indicates, items (b) and (c) require that the client specifically 
identify these items in the audit inquiry letter in order for the attorney to comment 
on them.  Regarding unasserted possible claims, the client should only ask the 
attorney to comment on a matter if the claim is probable of assertion and there is a 
reasonable possibility that the outcome will be both unfavorable and material to the 
financial statements.52 
For matters that require the communication of information to the auditor, 
the lawyer may disclose the “identification of the proceedings or matter, the stage of 
proceedings, the claim(s) asserted, and the position taken by the client.”53  The ABA 
Statement cautions attorneys that an adverse party may assert the attorney’s 
evaluation of a claim as an admission at a later date.54  In addition, the Statement 
advises lawyers against predicting the outcome of claims “except in those relatively 
few clear cases where it appears to the lawyer that an unfavorable outcome is either 
‘probable’ or ‘remote.’”55  In classifying the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome, 
the ABA Statement uses the terms “probable” and “remote,” but it does not use 
“reasonably possible” as used in SFAS No. 5.  In addition, the ABA Statement 
defines “probable” and “remote” differently from SFAS No. 5.  An unfavorable 
outcome is considered probable “if the prospects of the claimant not succeeding are 
judged to be extremely doubtful and the prospects for success by the client in its 
                                                 
51 Id. ¶5, at 6-7. 
52 See id. at 7. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. ¶1(c), at 6. 
55 Id. ¶5, at 8. 
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defense are judged to be slight."56  An unfavorable outcome is considered remote “if 
the prospects for the client not succeeding in its defense are judged to be extremely 
doubtful and the prospects of success by the claimant are judged to be slight.”57  The 
Commentary to the ABA Statement states more broadly that “in most situations, an 
unfavorable outcome will be neither ‘probable’ nor ‘remote’ as defined.”58  In other 
words, furnishing judgments to the auditor about the outcome of litigation is 
unnecessary in most situations. 
 Likewise, although the lawyer may specify an estimated dollar amount of a 
“probable” loss, the ABA Statement discourages the lawyer from doing so.  “[T]he 
amount or range of potential loss will normally be as inherently impossible to 
ascertain, with any degree of certainty, as the outcome of the litigation.”59  The ABA 
Statement recommends that a lawyer specify a dollar amount only if the likelihood 
that the loss estimate will be incorrect is slight.60  The lawyer should rarely provide a 
specific estimate of a loss amount for unasserted claims and assessments.61  “[A] 
decision to treat an unasserted claim as ‘probable’ of assertion should be based only 
upon ‘compelling judgment.’”62 
 The ABA acknowledges that an attorney has a professional responsibility to 
refrain from knowingly assisting a client in violating securities laws and may be 
required to resign as counsel in the event the client disregards advice concerning 
disclosures.63  In fact, the auditor may assume that when the lawyer becomes aware 
of unasserted possible claim or assessments potentially requiring disclosure, he or she 
will discuss the need for disclosure and the applicable SFAS No. 5 requirements with 
the client.64  More specifically, the lawyer should encourage the client to disclose an 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Commentary, at 17. 
59 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶5, at 8. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
62 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Commentary, at 17. 
63 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶6, at 8. 
64 Id. at 8-9. 
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unasserted possible claim or assessment to the auditor if the lawyer feels that “(i) the 
client has no reasonable basis to conclude that assertion of the claim is not probable . 
. . and (ii) given the probability of assertion, disclosure of the loss contingency in the 
client’s financial statements is beyond reasonable dispute required.”65  
III.  WHAT’S TO BE SCARED OF?:  LOOKING AT THE CASE LAW 
A.  The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine 
 The ABA Statement strongly emphasizes the importance of the attorney-
client relationship and continually advises attorneys on how to limit their responses 
to audit inquiry letters.  The motivating factor behind this emphasis is the fear that 
the attorney’s judgment concerning liability might subsequently be used or disclosed 
in a future court action.  In the twenty-five years since SFAS No. 5, SAS No. 12, and 
the ABA Statement were promulgated, relatively few court decisions have addressed 
audit inquiry letters. Almost all of the cases that do address them focus exclusively 
on their discoverability and whether either the attorney-client privilege or the work 
product doctrine can be invoked to protect the audit inquiry letter from discovery.   
 The attorney-client privilege serves to protect confidential communications 
between a client and his lawyer and allows the client to make full disclosure to his 
lawyer when discussing legal matters.  The Supreme Court has stated that the 
purpose of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice.”66  When applying the attorney-
client privilege in federal courts, judges look to the development of the privilege 
under the common law.67   At its most basic level, the attorney-client privilege 
requires that the “communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining 
legal advice from the lawyer.”68  For example, a client cannot use the attorney-client 
                                                 
65 AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Commentary, at 18. 
66 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
67 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that the federal privilege law is guided by “the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and 
experience”). 
68 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d. Cir. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
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privilege to keep opposing counsel from discovering the underlying facts of a case 
merely by communicating them to his or her attorney.69 
 The attorney-client privilege may be destroyed in the event that any part of 
the confidential communication is subsequently disclosed to a third-party.   
 To retain the attorney-client privilege, the confidentiality surrounding 
the communications made in that relationship must be preserved.  
The purpose of the privilege is to foster full client disclosure to the 
lawyer; the privilege exists to assure the client that his private 
disclosures will not become common knowledge.  The need to cloak 
these communications with secrecy, however, ends when the secrets 
pass through the client’s lips to others.  Thus, a breach of 
confidentiality forfeits the client’s right to claim the privilege.70 
When determining if the privilege has been waived as a whole, courts look to 
whether the disclosure represented a significant part of the prior communication.71 
 The genesis of the work product doctrine can be found in the Supreme 
Court decision Hickman v. Taylor.72   In Hickman, an attorney attempted to obtain 
opposing counsel’s notes from witness interviews he had conducted in preparation 
for trial.73  The court noted that “memoranda, statements and mental impressions . . . 
fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege and . . . [could] not [be] 
protected from discovery on that basis.”74  In carving out the work product doctrine, 
the Court stated that “[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify 
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.”75   
While the work product doctrine shelters a lawyer’s research, analysis, legal theories, 
                                                 
69 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 
831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).  
70 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982). 
71 Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
72 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
73 Id. at 497. 
74 Id. at 508. 
75 Id. at 510. 
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and mental impressions; the Court pointed out that, just like the attorney-client 
privilege, the client could not use the work product doctrine to withhold relevant and 
non-privileged facts that are contained within the attorney’s materials.76   
The work product doctrine espoused in Hickman was later incorporated into 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Rule 26(b)(3).77  Limitations exist, however, 
regarding work product protection.  For example, the doctrine is limited to 
protecting “materials assembled and brought into being in anticipation of 
litigation.”78  As stated in the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, “Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant 
to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are 
not under the qualified immunity provided by [Rule 26(b)(3)].”79  One of the 
differences between the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine is 
that all confidential communications between the client and the lawyer are protected 
under the attorney-client privilege, while only those documents created during the 
course of or preparing for litigation are protected under the work product doctrine.  
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine is not an 
absolute privilege and can be waived.80  Unlike the attorney-client privilege, however, 
disclosure to a third party does not necessarily result in the waiver of the privilege 
under the work product doctrine.81  A waiver occurs only if the disclosure allows the 
opponent to gain access to the information.82  “[W]hen the disclosure is either 
inadvertent or made to a non-adversary, it is appropriate to ask whether the 
                                                 
76 Id. at 511. 
77 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning 
the litigation”). 
78 El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 542. 
79 FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) 1970 advisory committee’s note.  See also Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 
320 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1963). 
80 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). 
81 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991).  
82 Id. 
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circumstances surrounding the disclosure evidenced conscious disregard of the 
possibility that an adversary might obtain the protected materials.”83 
The following section will discuss how the courts have addressed the issue of 
audit inquiry letters’ discoverability.  The cases discussed below show how courts rely 
heavily on the aforementioned rules concerning the attorney-client privilege and the 
work product doctrine when examining issues related to audit inquiry letters. 
B.  Audit Inquiry Letter Cases 
 The first relevant case is United States v. El Paso Company.84  While not directly 
involving audit inquiry letters, the El Paso court’s analysis and reasoning was later 
relied on in subsequent legal opinions of other courts.  In El Paso, the Internal 
Revenue Service was seeking to enforce a summons regarding certain tax accrual 
workpapers of the El Paso Company in conjunction with a tax audit.85  El Paso’s tax 
department, which consisted of approximately 80 accountants and 10 attorneys, 
calculated these tax accrual workpapers in-house.86  The purpose of the tax accrual 
workpapers was “to insure that the corporation sets aside on its balance sheet a 
sufficient amount to cover [any] contingent tax liability.”87 
 El Paso attempted to resist the summons of the tax accrual workpapers by 
asserting both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.88  As part 
of the tax pool analysis performed during the annual financial statement audit, El 
Paso disclosed the contents of the tax accrual workpapers to the auditors so that they 
might evaluate the adequacy of the tax pool analysis.89  In discussing the attorney-
client privilege, the court found that revealing this information to the outside 
auditors destroyed confidentiality with respect to these documents.90  Once the 
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confidentiality of the information was destroyed, the ability to claim the privilege was 
waived.91  Interestingly, the court also noted that there was no way to tell which tax 
accrual workpapers had been prepared by tax department attorneys (as opposed to 
accountants) such that the privilege would apply.92   
 In addition to finding that the attorney-client privilege was not available, the 
court also determined that the work product doctrine could not prevent El Paso 
from complying with the IRS summons.93  The court stated that the tax accrual 
workpapers were not prepared in anticipation of litigation, in essence agreeing with 
the IRS that the papers were business work instead of legal work.94  The function of 
the workpapers was to support a number on the balance sheet and to comply with 
SEC regulations; thus they were more closely related to daily business than to 
litigation.95  “The primary motivation [of the tax pool analysis] is to anticipate, for 
financial reporting purposes, what the impact of litigation [over company tax returns] 
might be on the company’s tax liability.”96  One of the flaws in El Paso’s argument, 
however, was the fact that an outside firm handled tax litigation matters, and no 
indication existed that any of the tax accrual workpapers in question were ever 
referred to them.97 
 Two of the first cases about the discoverability of audit inquiry letters 
produced different results in different jurisdictions.  In United States v. Arthur Young 
& Company,98 the government sought discovery of an audit inquiry letter prepared in 
connection with the annual audit of Cities Service Oil and Gas.99  The audit inquiry 
letter contained the outside attorney’s analysis and mental impressions regarding a 
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pending case between Cities Service and the Department of Energy, including the 
potential effects of the lawsuit on the financial statements.100  The court found that 
the audit inquiry letter was protected by the work product doctrine and that the 
privilege had not been waived because “the documents were provided to [the 
accounting firm] under a specific assurance of confidentiality.”101  The work product 
doctrine protected the letter from discovery because “[t]he audit process required 
Cities’ counsel to provide the [outside auditor] with candid assessments and opinions 
of pending and potential litigation.”102  The lawyer’s interpretations, mental 
impressions, and opinions concerned a matter in litigation or in anticipation of 
litigation and were therefore protected under the work product doctrine.103 
 After losing in the Oklahoma district court in Arthur Young, the government 
sought enforcement of a subpoena for the exact same documents in an action 
against Gulf Oil Corporation in a Texas district court. 104  Gulf Oil had entered into a 
merger agreement with Cities Service.105  After also losing in the Texas district court, 
the government appealed the decision to the Temporary Emergency Court of 
Appeals.106 Although two district courts in different jurisdictions had found 
otherwise, the Court of Appeals ruled that the audit inquiry letter did not qualify for 
work product protection.107  The court justified its decision by stating that “[i]f the 
primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document is not to assist in 
pending or impending litigation, then a finding that the document enjoys work 
product immunity is not mandated.”108  The court determined that the audit inquiry 
letter was solely prepared for the business purpose of helping prepare audited 
                                                 
100 See id. at *3-4. 
101 Id. at *7. 
102 Id. at *9-10. 
103 See id. at *11. 
104 See United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d 292, 293 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1985). 
105 Id. 
106 See id. 
107 Id. at 297-98. 
108 Id. at 296. 
160             TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 7 
financial statements that would comply with federal securities laws.109  Citing El Paso 
as support for its decision, the court concluded that the audit inquiry letter had not 
been prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” which is a requirement for receiving 
work product protection.110 
 Not quite six months later, another district court found a completely 
opposite interpretation of the phrase “in anticipation of litigation” in Tronitech, Inc. v. 
NCR Corporation.111  Tronitech attempted discovery of an audit letter prepared by 
NCR’s counsel for NCR’s accountants that discussed the financial implications of 
the lawsuit between NCR and Tronitech.112  In finding that the audit letter was 
protected by the work product privilege, the court explained that “[a]n audit letter is 
not prepared in the ordinary course of business but rather arises only in the event of 
litigation.  It is prepared because of the litigation, and it is comprised of the sum total 
of the attorney’s conclusions and legal theories concerning that litigation.”113  The 
court stated that the Arthur Young court’s decision was based upon the “principles 
and purposes underlying the work product doctrine,” while the Gulf Oil decision 
relied on interpreting the phrase “prepared in anticipation of litigation” as meaning 
“created in order to assist in litigation.”114  The Tronitech court obviously found the 
Arthur Young court’s reasoning more convincing.115 
  In Independent Petrochemical Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,116 an 
insurance company succeeded in compelling the production of letters written by 
Independent’s counsel to its accountants.117  Because the documents in question 
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were prepared for the purpose of complying with federal securities laws,118 the 
company unsuccessfully argued that the documents were covered by the attorney-
client privilege or the work product doctrine.119  With respect to the attorney-client 
privilege, the court concluded that the letters were “clearly . . . written in connection 
with the rendering of accounting services.”120  The court stated that the letters “were 
not intended to convey confidential attorney-client information, but even if they 
were, such a privilege was waived by the disclosure [to the accountants].”121  
Regarding the applicability of the work product doctrine, the court found that the 
letters “were not prepared to assist [the corporation] in present, or reasonably 
anticipated, litigation but rather they were prepared to assist [the accountants] in the 
performance of regular accounting work done by such accounting firms.”122  Because 
the court determined that the letters were not prepared for litigation purposes, it 
ordered production of the documents.123 
 By the late eighties, lawyers who were not already wary of responding to an 
audit inquiry letter took notice after a New York City district judge issued a sealed 
opinion involving Drexel Burnham Lambert.124  Drexel Burnham Lambert engaged 
attorneys to conduct an internal investigation regarding allegations of securities 
fraud.125  The attorneys then subsequently used the information from their 
investigation to respond to an audit inquiry letter from Drexel’s independent 
auditors.126  The federal prosecutors sought the results of the investigation from 
outside counsel by issuing a subpoena.127  The attorneys refused to comply with the 
subpoena and argued that the information was protected by the attorney-client 
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privilege and the work product doctrine.128  In a sealed opinion, the judge ordered 
the production of the investigation materials, presumably finding that the attorneys 
waived the privileges by discussing the finding of the investigation with the outside 
auditors.129  The end result was essentially a subject-matter waiver due to the 
information conveyed in the lawyer’s response to the audit inquiry letter. 
 The ABA quickly responded in December 1989.130  While not mentioning 
Drexel Burnham by name, the Report of the Subcommittee on Audit Inquiry 
Responses stated that “[b]ecause of a recent court case and other judicial decisions 
involving lawyer’s [sic] responses to auditor’s [sic] requests for information, an area 
of uncertainty or concern has been brought to the Subcommittee’s attention.”131  
Lawyers were advised to encourage clients to put the following sentence in the audit 
inquiry letter:  “We do not intend that either our request to you to provide 
information to our auditor or your response to our auditor should be construed in 
any way to constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-
product privilege.”132  The report also encouraged lawyers to put a similar statement 
in their responses to audit inquiry letters.133  The report also acknowledged, however, 
that inclusion of this language might not prevent a court from determining that the 
client had waived the privileges.134  The AICPA announced that the inclusion of this 
anti-waiver language was not considered a scope limitation for audit purposes.135 
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 Finally, in Vanguard Savings and Loan Association v. Banks,136 the defendants 
sought letters prepared by outside counsel in response to an accounting firm’s audit 
inquiry letter request for comment on loss contingencies.137  The court ordered the 
plaintiffs to produce the letters to the extent that they contained facts concerning the 
various loss contingencies but allowed a redaction of any portions of the letter that 
contained attorney work product.138  The defendants argued that the work product 
privilege should not apply because the letters were not prepared in anticipation of 
litigation.139  The court, however, found that the attorneys’ response “contain[ed] 
thoughts and conclusions by plaintiffs’ attorneys in evaluating legal claims” and was 
thus protected as opinion work product.140  The court noted that the audit inquiry 
letter requested information concerning the “‘expected result including any probable 
loss’” and found that this request “[c]learly . . . [sought] counsel’s mental impressions 
and legal opinions which are protected from disclosure under the work-product 
doctrine.”141 
IV. TIME FOR REEDUCATION 
A.  Why Attorneys Are Reluctant to Say More 
 A review of relevant court decisions shows that the attorney-client privilege 
will not protect disclosure of the attorney’s response to the audit inquiry letter.  The 
primary problem with this privilege is that the attorney is disclosing information to 
an outside party (the independent auditor).  While the reasoning behind this rule is 
understandable, problems arise when courts apply it blindly in an auditing context. 
 First, in the course of performing an audit, the independent auditor confirms 
several types of information with outside parties.  For example, it confirms with 
banks the year-end cash balances in checking and savings institutions.  In addition, 
lenders confirm information regarding company loans, including year-end value, 
interest rates, covenant violations, and guarantees.  Similarly, the audit inquiry letter 
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attempts to confirm information regarding loss contingencies that the client has 
disclosed to the accountant.   
 Second, both courts and attorneys have historically discounted the 
confidentiality inherent in the accountant-client relationship.  Rule 301 of the Code 
of Professional Conduct, as promulgated by the AICPA, states, “A member in public 
practice shall not disclose any confidential client information without the specific 
consent of the client.”142  Infraction of any of the rules makes a member liable to 
disciplinary action.  In addition, although an accountant-client privilege is not 
available under the Federal Rules of Evidence; many states, including Tennessee, 
provide for such a privilege by statute.143  Like the attorney-client privilege, however, 
the accountant-client privilege may be waived if the information is disclosed to third 
parties or to the public.144  In confirming client information via the response to the 
audit inquiry letter, the attorney must communicate with the auditor.  The current 
privileges do not allow the attorney to disclose information to the accountants, even 
though the client could communicate separately with the attorney and the accountant 
and have the information remain privileged in some states.  It seems illogical that, by 
attempting to confirm the client’s information with the client’s consent, either the 
accountant or the attorney can destroy the privilege. 
 In addition, courts are split on whether responding to the audit inquiry letter 
waives the work product privilege.  Courts that denied the privilege primarily cited 
that the letter was prepared for a business reason and not for litigation purposes.  
While this argument certainly has merit, one of the main functions of the document 
is to learn about pending or anticipated litigation.  The letter provides information 
from the client regarding claims and assessments and asks the attorney to assess the 
claims.  The letter also asks the attorney to estimate an amount or range of loss on 
those claims for which he or she has predicted an unfavorable outcome.   
To say that requesting this information from the attorney is strictly business 
ignores that the underlying purpose is to confirm litigation exposure.  The response 
to the audit inquiry letter is intimately connected with litigation.  “But for” the client 
having claims filed against it, for which the accountant needs an evaluation from a 
professional familiar with the contingent nature of the matter, the audit inquiry letter 
would not be necessary.  If a client is not involved in any litigation and the attorney 
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confirms this via a response letter, a subsequent request to discover the audit letter is 
a moot point since the response never really disclosed anything.  The Tronitech court 
seemed to understand that the entire cycle of communications exists only because of 
litigation.145  To attempt to classify the document as a business or litigation document 
ignores the inherent dual role of the audit inquiry letter.  While the letter’s overall 
purpose is to ensure adequate financial statements, if it did not fundamentally relate 
to litigation matters there would be no need to communicate with the attorney at all. 
 Although in Vanguard the defendant attempted to argue that the letter was 
not created in anticipation of litigation, the court clearly understood the bigger 
picture.146  An attorney’s response clearly involves the type of mental impressions, 
thoughts, and opinions that should, without question, receive work product 
protection because they are blatant evaluations of claims.  One possible solution is 
for the attorney to specifically qualify and set off the work product portion of his or 
her response by stating, “The following information relates to mental impressions, 
thoughts, and opinions of the attorney, and in the event this document is 
subsequently sought via discovery measures, the following paragraphs should be 
redacted from the document before complying with all future discovery requests.” 
B. Why the Attorney’s Response to the Audit Inquiry Letter  
May Be Inadequate 
 
 In Gulf Oil, the defendants resisted disclosing the audit inquiry letter on 
policy grounds, stating that without work product protection attorneys will not be 
candid in their responses.147  The court dismissed this argument by believing that 
attorneys will not violate “legal and ethical obligations to render candid and complete 
opinions.”148  An argument exists, however, that courts have forced attorneys to be 
less than forthcoming in their responses by denying them work product protection.  
The result is an attorney response that contains statements that are nothing more 
than disclaimers.  An attorney can intentionally word a response to be so vague that 
it contains a lot of language that says very little.   
                                                 
145 See Tronitech, Inc., 108 F.R.D. at 656 (stating that an audit letter “arises only in the event of 
litigation” and is protected by the work product privilege). 
146 Vanguard, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13712, at *11-12. 
147 Gulf Oil Corp., 760 F.2d at 297. 
148 Id. 
166             TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [VOL. 7 
The ABA Policy Statement does not require the attorney to evaluate claims 
by classifying them as either “probable” or “remote.”149  In fact, even though these 
are the categories used by SFAS No. 5, an attorney is not restricted to these terms in 
communicating any evaluation to the auditor.150  The language attorneys were using 
caused such confusion that the AICPA eventually issued an interpretation guide to 
help “translate” an attorney’s response.151  The guide identified the following legal 
language as communicating a “remote” likelihood of an unfavorable outcome to the 
auditor:  “the possible liability to the company in this proceeding is nominal;” “the 
company will be able to defend this action successfully;” and “plaintiff’s case against 
the company is without merit.”152  The interpretation also identifies language that is 
considered unacceptable and that requires the auditor to follow up with the 
attorney.153 
The need to translate the attorney’s language used in the response potentially 
identifies another area of concern.  The possibility that an “expectation gap” exists 
between what the auditor requests and what the attorney provides is quite real.  For 
example, the audit inquiry letter requests disclosure of material litigation.  Over the 
years, however, accountants themselves have struggled with determining when an 
item is material.  Materiality is a concept not easily defined.  The SEC recently issued 
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 – Materiality, which criticized the use of qualitative 
benchmarks in evaluating whether an item is considered material.154  However, 
materiality has both a qualitative and quantitative aspect.  Although the audit inquiry 
letter specifies a materiality standard, questions still exist concerning whether the 
attorney’s view of materiality coincides with the auditor’s view.  For example, an 
individual claim might be considered immaterial, but it could become material when 
viewed collectively with other potential claims. 
Finally, the ABA Policy Statement and SFAS No. 5 use different definitions 
for the terms “probable” and “remote.”  These different definitions may make it 
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easier for attorneys to classify claims in a grey area between the two extreme 
classifications and may make it harder for an auditor to satisfactorily comply with 
SFAS No. 5. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 To really discover the adequacy or inadequacy of an attorney response to an 
audit inquiry letter, one would have to make an after-the-fact comparison by 
contrasting a material judgment to the attorney’s evaluation of the claim in his or her 
response.  However, this type of hindsight would seldom be practical.  In any event, 
the audit inquiry letter response can only disclose a limited amount of information.  
The attorney may be unaware of accident reports, EEOC complaints, or cases 
forwarded first to a company’s insurance carrier. 
 The time seems right for a “reeducation” of both attorneys and accountants.  
A change in the ABA Statement making it less hostile to the process would be 
productive.  In light of recent corporate scandals, the audit inquiry letter arguably is 
not doing enough to disclose potential loss contingencies.  For example, the audit 
inquiry letter could conceivably request information concerning other entities formed 
on behalf of the corporate client during the year or for a summary of transactions 
involving officers or directors.  While the response to the audit inquiry letter may 
leave something to be desired, court decisions over the past twenty years have only 
hindered improvements to the process.  In order to achieve meaningful change, 
reeducation may need to include the courts themselves in addition to attorneys and 
accountants. 
